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ARKANSAS'S REVISED ARTICLE 3: USER CAUTION
ADVISED!!
Sarah Howard Jenkins*
INTRODUCTION
The reporters for the Article 3 drafting process were authorized
to prepare a redraft that would modernize the substance of the Article
and conform its style to that of the other articles.' The resulting
revision of Article 3 is a major overhaul of former law. The revised
Article provides welcomed clarification of some murky issues such as
restitution for mistaken payment; 2 abrogates established rules such as
discharge of an accommodation party upon release of. the accom-
modated party and the doctrine of reservation of rights against a
surety;3 adds new rules and principles 4; and changes others.5 While
some of the rules have not changed, the underlying rationale for an
unaltered rule may have been modified. 6 The careful practitioner
should not make assumptions on any issue, even those etched in stone
prior to 1991. Below are some of the significant changes that may
prove to be traps for the unwary or untutored.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; B.A.,
1969 Hanover College; M.A. 1970, J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky. The author
wishes to thank Professors Fenton Adams, Arthur Murphey, and Glenn Pasvogel
for their comments on prior drafts of this article and research assistant Angela
Richardson for her assistance.
1. Uniform Commercial Code Current Payment Methods Project, 1988 A.L.I.
PROGRESS REPORT 4; see also D. Fenton Adams, Problems With the 1990 Revision
of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 U. ARK. LrrTE ROCK
L.J. 665 (1993).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-418 (Michie 1991); id. § 4-3-418 (Michie 1987)
(repealed 1991).
3. U.C.C. § 3-605, cmt. 3 (1990). But see Permanent Editorial Board [here-
inafter PEB] Commentary No. 11, Final Draft, amendment to Comment 3, § 3-
605 (Feb. 10, 1994).
4. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-411 (Michie 1991) (addressing refusal to
pay cashier's checks, teller's checks, and certified checks).
5. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-310(4) (Michie 1991) (providing that the
owner of a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument may not recover on the underlying
obligation), 4-3-402(b)(2) (Michie 1991) (providing that a representative may not
be liable to a remote holder who is not a holder in due course).
6. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-305(3) (Michie 1991) (distinguishing claim
in recoupment from a defense).
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I. GOOD FA=rH
Because former Article 3 did not contain a definition of good
faith, the subjective test of good faith, honesty in fact, of Article 17
was applicable under the former Article. Revised Article 3 now contains
its own definition of good faith which entails both a subjective and
an objective test.8 Under revised Article 3, good faith means honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing. 9 Eleven sections of revised Article 3 and ten sections of
amended Article 410 require the application of the two-part test of
good faith. The subjective standard "requires the trier of fact to
focus on the ... [party's] state of mind."" But, what does "fair
dealing" entail, especially in determining holder in due course status?
The objective component of the test, fair dealing, is not a
negligence test,' 2 but is equivalent to the second prong of the merchant
test of good faith under Article 2. In a given transaction, the prac-
titioner must ask whether the conduct complained of is consistent
with the reasonable expectations of the parties in light of their prior
course of dealings, if any; their course of performance, if any; the
prevalent practices regularly observed by those who engage in the
applicable business, profession, or capacity; and the express terms of
the instrument, even if the conduct is negligently but honestly done."'
The commercial context in which the conduct occurs determines if
the conduct is decent or fair.'
4
Comment 4 to revised Section 3-311 provides insight into the
concept of fair dealing. Comment 4 states that an insurance company
may lack good faith if it tenders a check in an unreasonably small
amount as an offer of an accord for a covered personal injury knowing
7. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989).
U. AR.. CO E -_ §N.  fl1rCU.PStAU flkAh;, 1001)
9. Id.
10. Amended Article 4 incorporates in its definitional terms revised Article 3's
definition of good faith. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-4-104(c) (Michie 1991).
11. Susan A. Wegner, Comment, Section 1-208: "Good Faith" and the Need
for a Uniform Standard, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 639, 650 (1990).
12. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4), cmt. 4 (1990).
13. See generally Proposed Final Draft of PEB Commentary No. 10, § 1-203
(Feb. 10, 1994); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 32
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1025 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding seller breached its duty to post
price in good faith when it failed to give either advance notice of pending price
change or to price protect for forward contracts entered by buyer before the posting
as practiced by the relevant trade).
14. See generally E. Allen Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CmI. L. REV. 666,
669 (1963).
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that the insured desperately needs the money. Although this conduct
could pass the "honesty in fact" test, it does not reflect fair dealing.
Thus, to obtain holder in due course status, the holder must take
the instrument honestly while dealing fairly. The new definition is
unlikely to change the result in Rose v. Spear,5 a case involving
unusual circumstances.
In Rose, the owner of bearer bonds lost possession of them
because of a fraudulent scheme. Later, the holder took the bonds at
a gambling house, at night, from two strangers, to secure a loan for
one-fourth of the value of the bonds. The bonds were not overdue.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that a careful examination of the
facts did not reveal actual knowledge or knowledge of such facts
that amounted to taking the bonds in bad faith. As other courts
have done, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that the failure
to acquire knowledge in some circumstances is the equivalent of bad
faith or dishonesty. 6 However, bad faith was not established here.
More importantly, the facts would not establish unfairness in dealing
between the holder and the transferors under the revised Article. There
were no prior dealings between the transferors and the holder to
establish any standard of conduct that could be violated; holder was
not a broker or dealer in bonds and could not, therefore, be held
to any custom for valuing or handling the bonds; because the bonds
were taken as "security for" rather than "in payment of" the loan,
no overreaching occurred in the exchange of values in the transac-
tions; 7 and the facts do not suggest oppression in the bargaining
process.'8 Thus, the good faith test under the revised Article would
be satisfied.
II. SURETYSHIP
A. The Accommodated Party
Under former Article 3, Section 4-3-415, "accommodated party"
was not a defined term, but, by implication, the accommodated party
was that party to the instrument to whom the accommodation party
(surety) was "lending his name." 19 Revised Article 3 supplies a definition
15. 187 Ark. 168, 58 S.W.2d 684 (1933).
16. See, e.g., Scott v. Davis, 214 Ark. 19, 24, 214 S.W.2d 504, 506 (1948).
17. See Henry J. Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code: Article 3,
Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collection, 29 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 409, 424 (1993) (suggesting fair dealing test might trigger the concept of
unconscionability).
18. Id.; see also, U.C.C. § 2-302 (1989).
19. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-415(1) (Michie 1987) (Repealed 1991).
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for accommodated party and. thereby limits the scope of
"accommodated party" as previously recognized. Only a party who
is a party to the instrument at the time of issuance and for whose
benefit value is given at the time of issuance can attain the status
of "accommodated party."20
Consequently, if a party whose engagement is being enhanced
by the presence of a surety or secondary obligation (the principal
debtor/obligor) was either not a party when the instrument was issued
or was a party at issuance but the instrument was issued for another's
benefit, then general suretyship law will govern the rights between
the principal debtor/obligor on the instrument and its surety (secondary
obligor) who is also a party to the instrument. However, revised
Article 3 will govern the rights and duties between any other party
to the instrument who was a party at the time of issuance and received
a direct benefit (accommodated party) and the surety (accommodation
party). For example,
Corporation A issues a note payable to Partnership that takes for
value. Partnership seeks to discount the note to Finance Company.
Finance Company is willing to purchase the instrument if Partner
X indorses the instrument personally. If Partner X indorses the
instrument without receiving a direct benefit, Partner X is an
accommodation party. As a party at the time the note was issued
and having received a direct benefit of the value given at issuance,
Corporation A is an accommodated party. Although Partnership
is a party (the payee) to the instrument at issuance, value is not
given for Partnership's benefit at issuance. Partnership is not an
accommodated party under Article 3 but a principal debtor/obligor
under general suretyship law.
General suretyship law will govern the rights and obligations between
Partner X, Partnership, and Finance Company while revised Article
3 will govern the rights and obligations between Partner X, Corporation
A, and Finance Company. Conduct by Finance Company may, in
some cases, result in varying outcomes under the two different sets
of rules. Areas of difference between general suretyship law and
revised Article 3 include the rights of reimbursement, enforcement,
subrogation, and the obligation of a creditor (obligee) to preserve the
secondary obligor's right of recourse.
20. PEB Commentary No. 11, Final Draft, Issue 1, Discussion at 2 (Feb. 10,
1994); U.C.C. §§ 3-419(a), 3-105(a) (1990).
21. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-419(e) (Michie 1991) with RESTATEMENT
OF SURETYSHIP §§ 18, 19, 22 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1993). See generally Sarah
H. Jenkins, Revised Article 3: Suretyship and Accord & Satisfaction, printed in
ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform
Commercial Code (December 1993).
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B. The Accommodation Party
Revised Article 3 defines an accommodation party as one who
signs the instrument to incur liability on the instrument without being
a direct beneficiary of the value given. 22 Comment 1 to the promulgated
version distinguishes between direct and indirect benefit. Thus, an
officer or shareholder who signs an instrument to incur liability and
only receives an indirect benefit should be deemed an accommodation
party. This clarification is consistent with the holdings in Hanson v.
Cheek 23 and Riegler v. Riegler,2 but should change the outcome of
the determination under former law of accommodation party status
in Nelson v. Cotham.2 In Nelson v. Cotham, a shareholder did not
attain accommodation status because signing the corporation's note
benefitted his business interest when the corporation received funds
to keep the corporation "afloat."
Under the revision, neither an officer nor a shareholder should
fail to attain accommodation party status for the receipt of an indirect
benefit. For example, if the value received in exchange for a negotiable
instrument is placed in the entity's account and is used as working
capital by the entity and an officer receives a salary in the ordinary
course of business or consistent with contract terms, express or implied,
the officer should attain the status of accommodation party. Likewise,
22. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-419(a) (Michie 1991). In Mobley v. Harmon, 304
Ark. 500, 803 S.W.2d 900 (1991), the Arkansas Supreme Court applied the direct
benefit test and correctly determined that the cosigner was in fact the accommodated
party. However, the court's construction of former section 4-3-606(1)(a) as permitting
an accommodated party to be entitled to a discharge because of an extension
granted to the accommodation party misses the mark. Former 4-3-606 and revised
4-3-605 only recognize a suretyship defense for one with a right of recourse. An
accommodated party has no right of recourse against the accommodation party.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-419(e) (Michie 1991); id. § 4-3-415(5) (Michie 1987). The
following reading of former 4-3-606(l)(a) is the proper reading:
The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that
without such party's consent the holder: (a)Without express reservation of
rights releases or agrees not to sue any person against whom the party
has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to suspend
the right to enforce against such person [any person against whom the
party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse] the instrument
or collateral or otherwise discharges such person [any person against whom
the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse] ....
AaiK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-606(l)(a) (Michie 1987) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added).
Thus, the accommodated comaker was not entitled to a discharge.
23. 251 Ark. 897, 475 S.W.2d 526 (1972).
24. 244 Ark. 483, 426 S.W.2d 789 (1968).
25. 268 Ark. 622, 595 S.W.2d 693 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (signing of note by
shareholder was to benefit his business interests by obtaining funds to keep his
corporation going).
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if a shareholder receives dividends as declared by the board of directors,
in the absence of facts establishing that the sole purpose of obtaining
the value given was to provide funds for the shareholder, the indirect
benefit should not prevent the shareholder from attaining
accommodation party status. In a fact pattern similar to Nelson,
some other rule or principle of law or equity may limit the shareholder's
right to enforce the instrument or assert its right of restitution under
revised Section 4-3-419(e), but the shareholder's status as an
accommodation party must be determined on the basis of whether
a direct benefit was received as the new section requires.
C. The Effect of Releases, Extensions, and Modifications on the
Accommodation Party
1. Reservation of Rights
Under former Article 3, to prevent the discharge of an
accommodation party and to preserve the accommodation party's
right of recourse against the accommodated party, a holder could
simply reserve its rights when granting the accommodated party a
release or an extension in time for payment. 2 However, revised Article
3 abolishes the reservation of rights doctrine. 27 Under the terms of
revised Section 4-3-605, the holder's rights against the accommodation
party are not adversely affected unless, in some cases, the
accommodation party suffers loss.2
2. Extensions in Time 9 and Material Modifications
A much litigated issue under former Arkansas law was the effect
of an extension in time or a material change in the underlying
26. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-606(2) (Michie 1987).
27. U.C.C. § 3-605, cmt. 3 (i9W). The PEB Commentary proposes an amend-
ment to comment 3. The amendment rephrases the language of Comment 3 to
eliminate the necessity of reserving rights, rather than abolishing the doctrine of
reservation of rights as Comment 3 currently states, to preserve recourse against
the accommodation party.
28. General suretyship law is distinguishable from the new rule of revised Article
3. A secondary obligor (surety) is discharged by the obligee's agreement to release
or extend the time of the principal obligor's performance unless the express terms
of the release or extension provide that the obligee's (creditor's) rights against the
secondary obligor and the secondary obligor's rights against the principal obligor
are retained. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP § 34 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1993). Upon
express preservation of rights, the secondary obligor's rights against the principal
obligor are retained as though the release or extension did not occur. Id. § 34(2).
29. For a discussion of the effect of an extension of the due date on the
accommodation party's duty to perform, see Sarah H. Jenkins, Revised Article 3:
Suretyship and Accord & Satisfaction, printed in ALI-ABA Course of Study Ma-
terials, The Emerged and Emerging New Uniform Commercial Code (December
1993).
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obligation on the accommodation party's duty to perform a0 Under
former law, in the absence of consent or reservation of rights, the
accommodation party was discharged upon any suspension of the
right of enforcement or material alteration of the accommodated
party's duties. If the accommodation party consented in advance to
renewal of the obligation or change in interest rate, in the absence
of language indicating that successive extensions (renewals) or changes
9were authorized, Section 4-3-118(f) limited the prior consent to a
single extension not longer than the original term of the obligation.
Revised Article 3 substantially modifies these rules. First, an
accommodation party is only discharged upon an extension in time,
with or without consideration, if the accommodation party3' proves
that the extension caused loss with respect to its right of recourse. 32
On the other hand, if a material modification other than an extension
in time occurs, such as an increase in interest rate, the accommodation
party is discharged to the extent of its right of recourse unless the
person enforcing the obligation proves that no loss resulted or the
amount of loss was less than the amount of the right of recourse.33
Furthermore, revised Section 4-3-605(i) expressly authorizes consent
to conduct that could otherwise result in discharge. More significantly,
the text of former Section 4-3-118(f) is deleted from the revised statute.
The statutory authorization to limit the effectiveness of prior consent
to an extension in time to one single extension no longer exists. Thus,
the accommodated party's consent should not be limited to one single
extension or a single change in rate in the absence of an express
term to the contrary. This is a significant change from the case law
that developed under former Article 3.-
D. Release or Discharge of the Accommodated Party
Discharge or release of the accommodated party by the holder
without the consent of the accommodation party or reservation of
rights against the accommodation party discharged the accommodation
party under former law. 35 Revised Section 4-3-605(b) changes this
30. Sanders v. Stephens Sec. Bank, 75 B.R. 746 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Sanders v.
First Nat'l Bank, 75 B.R. 751 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Sanders v. Merchants & Planters
Bank, 75 B.R. 757 (W.D. Ark. 1987); Mcliroy Bank & Trust v. Maestri, 297 Ark.
130, 759 S.W.2d 808 (1988).
31. By its terms, § 4-3-605 is also applicable to indorsers. ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-3-605 (Michie 1991).
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-605 (Michie 1991).
33. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-605(d) (Michie 1991).
34. See supra note 30.
35. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-606(l)(a) (Michie 1987) (Repealed 1991).
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result. Release of the accommodated party does not discharge the
accommodation party. Furthermore, unlike the effect of loss on the
accommodation party's duty of performance if an extension in time
is given or a material modification occurs, sustaining a loss upon the
release of the accommodated party does not minimize the
accommodation party's liability.36
III. INDORSER'S DUTY TO PAY SUBSEQUENT INDORSERS
A. Anomalous Indorsers
Under prior Article 3, in the absence of agreement, the relationship
between anomalous successive indorsers37 or sureties was that of
subsuretyship. Each subsequent indorser had a right of indemnification
from the prior indorser. 38 Revised Article 3, however, changes the
presumption. Except as provided in the instrument or by agreement
of the affected parties, two or more persons who have the same
liability on an instrument as anomalous indorsers are jointly and
severally liable with a right of contribution.39 Thus, a cosuretyship
relationship is presumed. The kind of contract engagement made rather
than the "successive" nature of indorsements determines the nature
of the relationship between anomalous indorsers.
B. Other Indorsers
Indorsers who are not anomalous indorsers, indorsers outside the
chain of title, or sureties, owe an obligation of performance to any
subsequent indorser. Thus, under revised Article 3 a subsequent indorser
may enforce the obligation of any prior indorser.4
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-605(b) (Michie 1991). The formulation and effect
of U.C.C. § 3-605 has been criticized. See generally Neil B. Cohen, Suretyship
Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifications and Substantive Changes, 42 ALA.
L. REV. 595 (1991); Sarah H. Jenkins, Abrogation of the Surety's Right of Discharge
on Release of the Principal Obligor Under Revised Article 3: A Creditor's Tool
for Maximizing Self-Interest, 44 OKLA. LAW REV. 661 (1992); see also Donald J.
Rapson, History and Background of the Restatement of Suretyship, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 989, 1005 n.74 (1993).
37. Anomalous indorsers are indorsers outside the chain of title and are presumed
to be sureties under both the former and revised articles. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
3-415(3) (Michie 1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-205(d) (Michie 1991).
38. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-414(2) (Michie 1987).
39. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-3-205(d), 4-3-116(a), (b) (Michie 1991).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-415(a) (Michie 1991).
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IV. EFFECT OF WORDS OF GUARANTY ON INDORSER'S OBLIGATION
Words guaranteeing payment added to an indorsement under
former Article 3 waived presentment, notice of dishonor, and protest.4 1
However, the Permanent Editorial Board has expressed an intent to
clarify this rule under revised Article 3.42 Under the proposed clari-
fication stated in PEB Commentary Number 11, unless the added
words unambiguously guarantee collection, words of guaranty will be
without effect. The engagement will be treated as an engagement
without words of guaranty and presentment and notice of dishonor
would be required. Language guaranteeing payment no longer results
in an engagement to pay without resort to any other party. Con-
sequently, language guaranteeing payment does not waive presentment,
notice of dishonor, and protest. 43 Under this revision to comment 4
to revised Section 3-419, the express repeal of prior law under Section
3-416 (1), (3), and (5) is clarified.
V. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
A. Discharge of an Unliquidated or Disputed Claim
The common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction recognized
the discharge of an unliquidated or disputed claim upon the creditor's
negotiation of a check containing an explicit declaration that it was
tendered in full and final settlement of claims. The precept also
applied where the debtor tendered a check accompanied with an oral
declaration of similar content. A creditor could not avoid the effect
of the doctrine by cancelling the explicit declaration or otherwise
reserving rights or protesting before negotiating the instrument.
By its terms, former Section 1-207 permitted a party to act
consistently with terms offered by another without prejudice to any
rights held if there was explicit reservation of rights. Courts and
commentators were divided on the issue of whether Section 1-207
abrogated the common law rule of accord and satisfaction."
41. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-416(1), (5) (Michie 1987).
42. PEB Commentary No. 11, Final Draft, revised Comment 4 to U.C.C. § 3-
419 (Feb. 10, 1994).
43. Id.
44. See Anderson v. Rosebrook, 737 P.2d 417, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1312
(Colo. 1987); County Fire Door Corp. v. C.F. Wooding Co., 520 A.2d 1028, 3
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d I (Conn. 1987); Pillow v. Thermogas Co., 6 Ark. App.
402, 644 S.W.2d 292, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1404 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Rosenthal,
Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 48 (1978). But see AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 544 N.E.2d 869, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1181 (Ohio 1989); Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1591 (N.Y. 1985); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 13-21 (3d ed. 1988).
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The 1991 amendment to Section 4-1-207(2) 45 expressly exempts
accord and satisfaction from the application of Section 1-207. Revised
Section 4-3-311 governs the effect of the tender of a negotiable
instrument with an explicit declaration or accompanying communication.
Revised Section 4-3-311 codifies the doctrine reflected in Pillow v.
Thermogas Co.,46 with limited adaptations in recognition of modern
business methods of handling negotiable instruments.47 This rule has
an effect on the law concerning accommodation parties. Although
the release of the accommodated party is not a defense to the
accommodation party's obligation even though the accommodated
party pays some consideration for the release,48 if the accommodated
party's release results from an accord and satisfaction in settling a
disputed claim, the accommodated party's obligation is discharged
and the accommodation party has a defense to its obligation. 49
VI. CONVERSION AND FORGERY
A. Conversion
One area of former Article 3 in need of monumental change
was that of conversion liability. Under former law, a depositary bank
was not a proper defendant in a conversion action if it had with
good faith, honesty in fact, and according to reasonable commercial
standards of ordinary care of the industry in its locality" dealt with
an instrument bearing a forged indorsement unless it had proceeds
in its hands.5 As a result, the true owner was often forced to seek
recovery from a distant payor bank which in turn sued the depositary
bank that dealt with the forger for its breach of presentment warranty.
The former rule was inefficient and inconvenient.
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-1-207 (Michie 1991); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
3-311 (Michie 1991).
46. 6 Ark. App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982).
47. See Hardison v. Jackson, 45 Ark. App. 49, 871 S.W.2d 410 (1994); Burke
Co. v. Hilton Dev. Co., 802 F. Supp. 434, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 6 (N.D. Fla.
1992) (discussing revised § 3-311); Arthur G. Murphey, Revised Article 3 and
Amended Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Comments on the Changes
They Will Make, 46 ARK. L. REv. 501, 532-38 (1993).
48. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1990); U.C.C. § 3-605, cmt. 3 (1990).
49. PEB Commentary No. 11, Final Draft, amended comment 5 to U.C.C.
§ 3-305 (Feb. 10, 1994).
50. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-419 (Michie 1987).
51. See First Bank & Trust v. Vaccari, 288 Ark. 233, 703 S.W.2d 867 (1986)
(finding depositary bank acted commercially unreasonably in failing to inquire into
depositor's authority to open and deposit checks into new account).
[Vol. 16:573
ARKANSAS'S REVISED ARTICLE 3
Revised Article 3 now authorizes direct action by the true owner5 2
against the depositary bank. A depositary bank falls within the definition
of a "bank [that] . . .obtains payment,"" and, further, the depositary
bank is expressly excluded from the statutory exception to liability
for conversion available for certain representatives . 4 This was a much
needed change.
B. Forgery
Revised Article 3 also expands the defenses available to those
subject to liability, such as a depositary bank, for making or obtaining
payment of instruments bearing indorsements forged by employees.
The revision allocates to employers the risk of loss for indorsements
forged by certain classes of employees. The employer is in the best
position to avoid and minimize loss by selecting and supervising its
employees, and through implementing measures to prevent loss." If
an employee, including an independent contractor or its employee,
who has responsibility for instruments5 6 forges an indorsement of the
employer or of the payee of an instrument issued by the employer,
the indorsement is effective as to one who in good faith pays or
takes the instrument for value or collection.5 7 Furthermore, negligence
or the failure to exercise ordinary care will not preclude the person
taking or paying in good faith from asserting the effectiveness of the
indorsement. However, if the negligence of the person taking or paying
the instrument substantially contributes to loss suffered by the employer,
the employer may recover to the extent the failure to exercise ordinary
care contributed to the loss.5"
Under revised Article 3, the outcome of First Bank & Trust v.
Vaccari" may be altered. In Vaccari, a bookkeeper with check writing
authority for eleven years was terminated after her embezzling was
52. Revised Article 3 also delineates the proper plaintiff in a conversion action.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-420(a)(i-ii) (Michie 1991).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-420(a) (Michie 1991).
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-420(c) (Michie 1991).
55. U.C.C. § 3-405, cmt. 1 (1990).
56. Responsibility is broadly defined as authority to sign or indorse; to process
instruments for bookkeeping, deposit, or other disposition; to supply information
regarding payee names or addresses; to control the disposition of instruments issued
in the name of the employer; or to act otherwise with respect to instruments in
a responsible capacity, but not including access to instruments or blank or incomplete
instruments that are being stored, transported, or are part of the mail. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-3-405(a)(3) (Michie 1991).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-405 (Michie 1991).
58. Id.
59. 288 Ark. 233, 703 S.W.2d 867 (1986).
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discovered. Later, she was rehired as bookkeeper but without check
writing authority. Thereafter, she opened an account in Jonesboro
in the employer's name (Walnut Ridge Flying Service) using the
employer's tax identification number and address. No indicia of
authority such as resolutions by the Board of Directors was requested
by the bank's new-accounts clerk.6 Thereafter, the bookkeeper deposited
checks payable to her employer and appropriated $41,000 in funds.
The jury found the depositary bank failed to act consistent with
reasonable commercial standards. Because it failed to satisfy the
exemption from liability available under former Article 3, the depositary
bank was liable for the amounts appropriated.
Under the new law, the depositary bank would be liable for
conversion because it obtained payment of an instrument for one not
entitled to enforce the instrument-the bookkeeper. However, the loss
may be allocated to the employer under Section 4-3-405 because the
bookkeeper is an employee.
Although she no longer had check-writing authority, if when
rehired she had some authority to process instruments for bookkeeping
purposes or to otherwise handle checks within the broad statutory
definition of "responsibility," the employer will be allocated the loss
if the depositary bank can satisfy the new good faith test. Here, the
bank honestly took the instrument for collection and did not violate
the mores of fair dealing, but it violated its duty of ordinary care
in failing to require some indicia of authority. This kind of negligence
has been held to satisfy the "substantially contributed test" in another
jurisdiction. 6' Under the revised article, however, the depositary bank
is entitled to have its negligence compared with the employer's and
to shift much of the loss to the employer that granted a known
embezzler "responsibility" for instruments. Hence, the employer should
only recover to the extent the bank's lack of care contributed to the
Even assuming that the employee did not have check-writing
responsibility within revised Section 4-3-405(a)(3), revised Section 4-
3-406 contains a similar comparative negligence standard. Ultimately,
if both the bank and the employer were negligent, both must bear
some responsibility for the loss.
60. The court's opinion suggests that the depositing of corporate checks into
the bookkeeper's individual account, "her account," violated reasonable commercial
standards. The account was in a name substantially similar to that of the corporation.
61. See, e.g., Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 726, 1
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 276 (Or. 1962).
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VII. SIGNATURES BY REPRESENTATIVES
A. The Principal's Liability
Under former Article 3, a principal could potentially escape
liability on a negotiable instrument signed by its authorized agent.
Section 3-401 limits liability on a negotiable instrument to one whose
signature appears on the instrument. Although former Section 3-403(1)
provided that a signature could be made by an agent or other
representative, comment 2 to the Section stated that a principal was
only liable if the instrument named the principal and showed that
the signature was made on behalf of the principal. Thus, if an agent
had actual, apparent, or inherent power to bind the principal to a
promise or order to pay and the agent only signed his or her name,
the holder could not recover from the principal on the instrument.
Furthermore, in litigation between immediate parties, the payee and
the agent, the agent could establish that no personal liability was
intended and the payee would be left without a right of recovery.
This outcome was inconsistent with general agency principles62 and
was criticized. 63 The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to follow the
literal requirements of the statute in litigation between immediate
parties. 64 Because parol evidence was admissible to show that the
payee and agent did not intend the agent to be personally liable on
the instrument, the court authorized the admission of parole evidence
to establish the principal's liability. 65
Under former Article 3 parole evidence was inadmissible in litigation
between remote parties, a subsequent holder and the agent. 66
Consequently, in those cases, the agent was bound and the absurd
result did not follow.
Revised Article 3 changes the rule of the former article and
recognizes the liability of the principal when the signature executed
by an agent would bind a principal under agency law even though
the principal is unnamed in the instrument and representative capacity
62. See Sarah H. Jenkins, A Payee Who is a Holder in Due Course May be
Subject to Personal Defenses Arising From Unauthorized Acts or Promises by an
Agent, 9 ST. Louis PUB. L. REV. 191, 208 (1990).
63. Evelyn Hills Pharmacy, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 Ark. 351, 712 S.W.2d
291 (1986); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 490-92 (2d
ed. 1980).
64. Evelyn Hills Pharmacy, Inc. v. First National Bank, 289 Ark. .351, 712
S.W.2d 291 (1986).
65. Evelyn Hills Pharmacy, 289 Ark. at 355, 712 S.W.2d at 293.
66. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-403(2)(b) (Michie 1987).
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is not shown. 67 An authorized agent who signs his or her name or
the name of the principal without showing representative capacity
binds the principal.
B. Representative Liability
Under former law, an agent was liable on the instrument if the
principal's identity was undisclosed on the instrument; that is, neither
the principal's name nor the agent's representative capacity was shown.
As discussed above, in litigation between immediate parties, the payee
and the agent, an agent who failed to either name the principal or,
failed to include representative capacity in his or her signature could
introduce parol evidence to establish that personal liability was not
intended. 68 This right was unavailable in litigation between remote
parties.69 Revised Article 3 changes the rule of representative liability.
If the agent ambiguously shows representative capacity, the agent
either names the principal or shows representative capacity without
naming the principal, the agent is liable on the instrument to a holder
in due course.70 Hence, in litigation between a holder subsequent to
the payee, the agent may introduce parol evidence to show that
personal liability was not intended if the holder is not in due course.
The subsequent non-HDC is subject to the personal defense of
representative capacity.
CONCLUSION
Revised Article 3 provides some welcomed changes and clarifi-
cations in negotiable instrument law. However, new problems and
questions must be resolved. A practitioner should carefully review all
relevant sections before attempting to advise a client or provide
direction to a court on the effect of revised Article 3.
67. See Jenkins, supra note 62, at 202-11, for a discussion of general agency
principles.
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-403(2)(a) (Michie 1987).
69. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-403(2)(b) (Michie 1987).
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-3-402(b)(2) (Michie 1991).
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